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In the SupreJDe Court
of the State of Utah

D. \V. NICHOL,

)

Ptaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 7881

HENNING WALL,
Defendant and Appellant.
VIRGINIA WALL,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal by defendant Henning Wall from
a judgment made and entered by the District Court of
Salt Lake County, Clarence E. Baker, Judge, following
trial of the cause by the Court without a jury, and from
the denial by the Court of appellant's Motion for a
New Trial. The judgment recovered was a money
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judgment in the amount of $847.51, which amount was
found to be due and owing by appellant to respondent
for labor and materials furnished, after allowance had
been made by the Court of certain offsets contained
in appellant's counterclaim (R. 2).
Respondent, a building contractor, and appellant
had been acquainted for many years. They were "old
friends" (R. 25). After appellant's house had been
largely constructed and required only finishing work
the parties entered into an oral agreement whereby
respondent was to furnish certain labor and materials
for the house, and was to receive in return therefor
certain materials and the use of certain equipment
owned by appellant (R. 8). Respondent testified that
each party would pay the other the "reasonable charge"
for the use of the other's equipment, that they were
''passing equipment back and forth'' and that the
charge of one would offset the other (R. 24, 25).
Materials and labor were furnished as detailed by
respondent (R. 8 et seq.), and he received materials
and use of equipment in exchange. He did not receive
enough to offset his charges, and appellant refused to
pay the difference, apparently because appellant and
his wife believed the respondent's charges were unreasonable (R. 35, et seq.).
When respondent instituted this action appellant
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and his wife were named defendants, but at the conclusion
of plaintiff's evidence the Court granted the motion of
defendant, Virginia \Vall, for a Judgment of Dismissal
since no case had been proved against her, and the action
proceeded against appellant alone (R. 32).
The respondent's complaint was disputed ·by appellant only to the extent that he did not belive that respondent was reasonably entitled to as much as was claimed.
Since the Trial Court found against appellant on this
phase of the matter, and since there is evidence to support the Trial Court's finding, no question is being
raised on this appeal concerning the reasonableness of
respondent's claims.
Respondent, in turn, did not dispute the items
claimed by appellant in his counterclaim except that
the sum of $680.00, claimed by appellant for the rental
of a Disston chain saw, was resisted and disputed by
respondent, who testified that he did not "agree" with
that sum but that he would be willing to pay a "fair
rental on it" (R. 24). The Trial Court found the rental
value to be the sum of $100.00, or $580.00 less than
asked by appellant. Therefore, this appeal concerns
itself solely with the question of the reasonable rental
value of the chain saw.
No evidence was produced by either party from disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

interested sources as to the reasonable rental value of
such equipment at the time such equipment was rented,
which was in September and October, 1948. Respondent
produced no evidence on the subject whatever, but
appellant, after being properly qualified (R. 48) stated
that because such saws were so difficult to obtain and
because the hazards entailed in their use in the forests
were so great, the reasonable rate of rental of such
saws in the area in question at the time in question was
$20.00 per day (R. 48). It was established without doubt
that respondent had been in possession of appellant's
chain saw for a period from September 20, 1948, to
October 29, 1948, a period of 39 days, and while the
saw was not being used throughout that time appellant
finally was required to retrieve the saw from respondent (R. 50). Appellant allowed five days off the total
period and billed respondent for 34 days rental at $20.00
per day (Exhibit A).

At the conclusion of the evidence Counsel for
respondent made a "tender of proof" (R. 60) concerning an 0. P. A. regulation and claimed that such
regulation would show "twelve per cent per month of
the purchase price'' as the maximum rental allowed
under 0. P. A. regulations. This "tender of proof" was
made despite the fact that Counsel had no such proof
available, in that there was no 0. P. A. regulation in
his possession or in court, and no witness available to
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testify concerning the regulation even if the Trial Court
had felt that ~uch proof was proper. The tender was
made after son1e colloquy between the Court and Counsel
in which it was n1ade to appear that the regulations
referred to by Counsel had no application to any particular area, were out of date, and were not shown to be
related to the type or kind of saw in question, or to the
use to which this saw was put (R. 59, 60).
Following argument the Court ruled orally that
respondent would be entitled to judgment of $1136.39,
less the admitted offsets claimed by appellant, together
with the sum of $100.00 rental for the chain saw. Counsel
inquired of the Court as to the basis for the finding of
$100.00 chain saw rental, to which the Court responded
that he regarded that figure as ''a fair and reasonable
rent" for the saw and "**~'that is twelve per cent of
the purchase price or thereabouts anyhow.'' Counsel
for appellant then inquired if the Court in referring to
the twelve per cent figure was using evidence which had
been rejected, to which the Court replied: ''I am not
saying. ***" (R. 60A).
Following the preparation of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and entry of Judgment appellant
moved the Court for a new trial, urging that the findings
and judgment were against the weight of the evidence,
and specifically urging that the Court, in concluding that
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$100.00 was a reasonable value for rental of the chain
saw, made such a finding without any support in the
evidence, and on the basis of rejected evidence, and in
total disregard of the only evidence admitted in the case,
which was to the effect that a reasonable rental was the
sum of $680.00. The Motion for New Trial was denied
and this appeal resulted (R. 68).
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE REASONABLE
VALUE OF THE RENTAL OF THE CHAIN SAW, SINCE ITS
FINDING IS WITHOUT SUPPORT IN THE EVIDENCE AND
DISREGARDS UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE, AND A
JUDGMENT BASED ON SUCH A FINDING SHOULD NOT
BE SUSTAINED.

ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE REASONABLE
VALUE OF THE RENTAL OF THE CHAIN SAW, SINCE
ITS FINDING IS "WITHOUT SUPPORT IN THE EVIDENCE
AND DISREGARDS UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE, AND
A JUDGMENT BASED ON SUCH FINDING SHOULD NOT
BE SUSTAINED.

A thorough examination of the record in this case
reveals that there was no evidence before the Court to
sustain a finding of $100.00 as being reasonable value
of the rental of the chain saw. The only evidence on the
subject which was admitted in the case was evidence by
the appellant, who testified that he had been in the
business of cutting timber for approximately seven years
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and had had occasion to try to rent chain saws, and was
aware of the prevailing practices in the equipment
industry at the period. in question. ,He stated that because
of the extraordinary hazards to such rnachinery when
it is used in the rnountains and forests to cut timber the
owners of chain saws have felt it necessary to receive
a high rental. If a tree being cut by the saw should bind,
or if it should fall at an unexpected time or in an unexpected direction, the saw could be severely damaged
and, in fact, could be crushed and destroyed. Such
factors obviously cause rentals to increase and, in view
of these factors, the evidence of appellant that a proper
rental charge for the saw was $20.00 a day is readily
understandable.

Respondent did not bring any evidence to the trial
of this case on this subject. He was, of course, aware
that appellant had claimed the sum of $20.00 per day,
since he had received a bill from appellant long before
trial (Exhibit A). If such rental is, in fact, not proper
and not in accord with the custom in the industry, it
seems to appellant that the burden of establishing those
facts and of overcoming appellant's proof was upon respondent after the appellant had produced his testimony.
The only attempt by respondent to satisfy this burden
consisted of the so-called ''tender of proof'' made by
Counsel for respondent after all the evidence had been
received. There can be no valid reason for this ''tender''
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except that it was designed to influence the Trial Court,
because Counsel knew that he had no evidence to back
up his "tender" if the Court had overruled appellant's
objection to the proferred proof. It seems clear that
Counsel was successful in this connection because the
Trial Court, when asked for a basis for his ruling,
resorted to the formula suggested by Counsel, which
formula had been rejected as evidence by the Court a
matter of moments before.
It is our position that a finding based upon rejected
evidence, and which totally disregards uncontroverted
evidence in the case, is finding which cannot support a
judgment and a judgment based on such finding should
be reversed.
We believe the general rule Is as stated in 3
American Jurisprudence 464:
''Findings not supported by any competent evidence, or which disregard uncontroverted, credible evidence, cannot be sustained on appeal and a
judgment based thereon will be reversed.''
Research indicates that this rule has been applied
by the Supreme Court of Utah on many occasions, but it
is customarily stated conversely, as the Court said in
the recent case of Buckley vs. Cox, 247 Pacific (2d) 277,

(1952):
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''If there is cmnpetent evidence in the record
to support the court'~ findings, the judgment
should not be disturbed.''
However, in the case of Hathaway vs. United Tintic

Mines Company, 42 Utah 520, 132 Pacific 388, decided in
1913, the headnote states the rule to be :
''The Trial Court should not make a finding of
fact where there is no evidence to support it, and
its judgment thereon will be reversed.''
In that case the action was brought to foreclose a
mechanic's lien against certain mining property. There
was no evidence in the record from which the Court
could legally determine that the respondent had complied
with the terms of the mechanic's lien statute. N otwithstanding this lack of evidence, the Trial Court found
that the statute had, in fact, been followed, and that the
respondent was entitled to a lien. In addition, without
any evidence whatever, the Court found that the respondent was entitled to costs for preparing and filing a lien
and $25.00 attorneys' fees for foreclosing the lien.

This Court, in reversing the judgment, commented
that the lower court might just as well have entered
a judgment against any other citizen of the state as
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against appellant, so far as the evidence justified such a
judgment. The Court went on to say:
"No court should permit itself to make a finding
of fact where the record is conclusive ... that
there is absolutely no evidence to support such
findings.''
Research indicates that this case, and its companion
case decided the same day and upon the same principles,
have never been overruled and are still the law of this
state.

In a later case analogous in principle to the case
at bar is Stringfellow vs. Botterill Automobile Company,
63 Utah 56, 221 Pacific 861, (1923). In that case plaintiff
brought suit to recover damages arising out of the sale
to him by defendant Company of a 1921 automobile,
in which sale defendant had represented that the car
was a 1922 model.

The Trial Court found the issues against plaintiff
and in favor of defendant despite the fact that the evidence on the question of the model of the car was conclusive against defendant. The Supreme Court stated
the rule to be that a finding of the Trial Court that a
buyer sustained no damage through the seller's breach
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of contract is not binding on appeal, if opposed to ·all
the evidence.
The Court concluded by saying that the Trial Court's
finding on the issue of damage "had no evidence whatever to support it and was against all the evidence.''
The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded
for a new trial.
In Miller vs. Manhattan Fire lt Marine Insurance Co.,
76 Utah 540, 290 Pacific 937, decided in 1930, the judgment of the lower court was reversed because there was
no support in the evidence for its findings. The Supreme
Court, in disposing of the case, commented that since
the action was one at law the Court was not authorized
to make or direct findings or to render a judgment,
but the Court said:
"We, finding, as we do, that the findings of the
Trial Court in the particulars indicated are not
supported by the evidence and that the judgment
is erroneous, are authorized only to reverse the
judgment and to remand the case for a new
trial.''
The principles of law discussed in the foregoing
argument have never been seriously questioned so far
as can be determined, and it is appellant's contention
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that the facts of this case require the application of
these principles. If this judgment is allowed to stand,
it will be a recognition and approval of the act of a
trial court in deciding a case and assessing damages
without regard to the evidence and on the basis of facts
and figures not lawfully and properly before the court
or admitted as evidence in the case.
CONCLUSION
This judgment is excessive in the amount of $580.00
because of the manifest error committed by the Trial
Court. While this is not an imposing sum it nevertheless represents considerably more than one-half of the
judgment now entered against appellant. The size of
the judgment, however, should have no bearing on the
question of the principle involved in this case and appellant respectfully submits that a judgment which is based
either upon no evidence, or a judgment which completely
disregards the evidence admitted in the case, should
not be sustained by this Court.

Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW
JOHN H. SNOW

Attor'Ytieys for Appellant
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November, 1952.
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